Essay Question:

Why did Macedon emerge as a major power in the Greek world of the 4th century BC?

Essay written by David Rohl (1st Year Ancient History/Egyptology).

Submitted to Riet van Bremen on 5th May 1988.

One of the most intriguing questions that has arisen in the study of 4th-century Greece is how Macedonia, with its new king Philip II, managed to emerge as the major power in the Greek world having in the previous 100 years only been on the fringes of the political arena. Perhaps more significantly, how did Philip, the instigator of this change, manage to survive the multiplicity of dangers that surrounded him on his succession and still find the resources to turn his weakened Macedonian army into the strongest fighting force in the region within five years of coming to power?

These issues have led to an interesting debate on the personality of Philip which, in turn, has boiled down to a simple question: 'Was Philip of Macedon a military genius, a cunning manipulator and wiley politician, or was he simply a very lucky man?'. The purported element of luck in his rise to power concerns the political circumstances of the time and the rather incredible series of events which took place in his first few years of rule. These events appear to have let Philip 'off the hook' when his kingdom was entering its most vunerable period and when any single positive initiative against Macedon on the part of his enemies might have cut the new king down in his prime.

The evidence for the charismatic and cunning leader hypothesis is certainly strong and few would argue that Philip was a man to be reckoned with. However, can it be said that he manipulated his own fortunes, taking advantage of the weaknesses and indecision of others, including the major powers of the time, or was the rise of a new force in the Greek world inevitable given the political exhaustion and bankruptcy of the three major imperialistic institutions of Athens, Thebes and Sparta?

In order to answer these questions we must first briefly review the historical scenario for the years 365 to 355 so as to establish the framework for our discussion. The table below summarises the major events of this ten-year period:

365 Perdiccas III becomes king of Macedon. Sometime later in his brief reign he provides troops for the defence of Amphipolis against Athenian attempts to annex this free and independent polis. Macedon thus goes on a war footing against Athens.

359 Perdiccas now turns towards the old enemy to the northwest in Illyria and attempts to overthrow the Dardanian king, Bardylis, who has been exacting heavy dues from Macedon. The two armies meet in battle and the Macedonian force is decimated, losing 4000 men. Perdiccas is killed on the battlefield.

Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, accedes to the throne as regent because the dead king's infant son, Amyntas, is too young to rule. The new regent manages to arrange a treaty with Bardylis by his marriage to the old king's daughter or niece, Audata (see below). He also buys off the Paeonian king so as to prevent an invasion from the northern plains. Philip then withdraws the Macedonian troops from Amphipolis and, by doing so, secures a peace with Athens. By achieving a cessation of hostilities with his three major adversaries the Macedonian regent finds time to restore the army to full strength and even begins a campaign, late in the year, against the Paeonians whose king has just died. This campaign is successful and the northerners are suppressed.

358 Philip, having secured a breathing space to re-establish the army following the Illyrian/Dardanian defeat of Perdiccas, now reneges on his treaty with Bardylis and crushes the Dardanian army. Philip is proclaimed king by the army. Resistance to the new monarch crumbles in the hill country and upper Macedon is incorporated into the rapidly expanding Philippian kingdom. Around this time Philip cements a mutual support treaty with the Thessalian League by marrying Philinna, a daughter of the Aleuadai of Larisa.

357 Philip achieves a second major alliance, this time with the kingdom of Epirus on the northwest coast of the Greek peninsula. He marries Olympias, the daughter of the late Molossian king of Epirus, Neoptolemos. She is the future mother of Alexander.

Outside Macedonian affairs, the Athenians have been preoccupied with their old adversary Thebes. Having managed to recapture Euboea, they turn their attentions to what is happening further north. They begin to make moves to form an alliance with the three major Balkan kings (Cetriporis of western Thrace, Lyppeus of Paeonia and Grabus of Illyria) whose lands boarder upon the frontier of the expanding Macedonian kingdom. Just as this jostling for position in anticipation of a possible future confrontation begins to get underway there is a major revolt within the Athenian hegemony instigated by Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantion. This 'Social War' distracts the attentions of Athens and as a result Philip is able to quickly capture Amphipolis, calculating correctly that Athens would not be able to respond with any conviction on account of its other troubles. Athens declares war on Macedon but takes no action to counter Philip's move against Amphipolis.

356 Philip then goes on to take both Pydna and Poteidaea. The latter he cedes to the Olynthians of the Chalcidian League, thus buying their tacet co-operation for his future plans for expansion in the region. In this same year the Macedonians take the rich mining region around Mount Pangaeum. Philip captures the town of Crenides and renames it Philippi. Macedon is now the possessor of great wealth thanks to the gold and silver mines under its control. This wealth is subsequently used to consolidate alliances, pay for mercenaries and to generally further Philip's ambitions concerning the rest of Greece.

Thus by 355 Macedon had extended its boundaries as far as the River Nestos in the east and Lake Lychnitis in the west. By the assassination of Philip and coronation of Alexander in 336 the Macedonian empire stretched to the Black Sea on the one hand and to the pass of Thermopylae on the other with the rest of Greece paying due obeisance to their new Macedonian masters.

Having established the basic facts of Philip's early rule we can begin to see a pattern to his kingship over Macedon. From his initial hopelessly weak position, the 22-year-old regent appears to have wangled a truce with his immediately threatening neighbour, Bardylis. This may have been possible because of the personality cults of the kings of northern Greece. It would have been a relatively easy ploy to blame one's predecessor for the aggressive moves against Illyria and profess undying allegiance to the victorious neighbouring state; and what better way to prove your loyalty than to marry the king's own daughter? It should be noted here that there is disagreement amongst scholars as to the date of this marriage. Ellis argues for 359 on the grounds that a treaty sealed by marriage affords the most satisfactory explanation for the sudden cessation of hostilities between Illyria and Macedon. On the other hand, Hammond proposes that the marriage to Audata took place after Philip had smashed the Illyrian forces in 358. The first scenario appears to me to have more substance where the second still requires an explanation for the lack of a follow-up invasion on the part of Bardylis. From what we have already discerned about Philip's political judgement, a ploy to buy time seems much more in character.

Likewise, a reduction of the aggressive posture towards Athens in terms of military support for Amphipolis would signal to the principal power in the region that Macedon was going to lay down and be a good boy during Philip's reign.

His later actions against these two powers strongly suggest that either Philip was forced to swallow a bitter pill for expediency's sake in his first tenuous year or that it was a deliberate ploy to lull his intended future victims into a false sense of security.

He certainly immediately set about building up the army which had been decimated in 359. During the battle in which Perdiccas died, over one third of the Macedonian army had been slaughtered, but by 358, just a year later, the army had grown to 10,000 men-at-arms and a cavalry of 600. So it was from a position of strength that he was able to smash the Illyrian forces and slaughter 7,000 of Bardylis' men, thus eliminating the threat from the northwest once and for all.

The other major plank of Philip's policy was the 'diplomatic marriage' which enabled him to secure allies both in the west and east. These alliances were often paid-for by the ceding over of cities captured by Philip to his new father-in-laws. The Macedonian army was able to strike at these cities with great rapidity being a highly mobile land-based force. The fact that the poleis concerned were mostly possessions of the Athenians, located on the northern shore of the Aegean, did much to ensure the success of these lightning strikes because the Athenian fleet on the other hand was unable to react within anything like a decent response time. This was partly due to the distances involved but mainly because political decisions in the capital had to be made even before the ships could leave the Peiraeus.

The Athenian economy had been severely strained following the efforts to recover Euboea, and now troubles were emerging for Athens in the eastern Aegean. They were clearly not in a mood to undertake any expensive actions against some northern upstart when their traditional enemy, Persia, was up to its old tricks trying to incite moves towards independence amongst the Aegean islands. Macedon also had an unwitting ally in Eubulus, the Athenian statesman who expanded the revenues of the Theoric Fund by diverting money which would otherwise have gone towards military enterprises. It was not until the call to arms made by Demosthenes in 349 that Athens began to wake up to the threat from Philip and his Macedonian army.

It is hard to imagine that Philip would not have endeavoured to exploit the situation with anything but the greatest of enthusiasm. When Athens did later try to confront the Macedonian army, Philip's land-based forces simply withdrew inland forcing the Athenian fleet to return home without an enemy to fight.

The crowning achievement of the early years of Philip's reign was the capture of the rich mining region around Mount Pangaeum and, in particular, the Asyla mines near Philippi which provided an annual income of 1000 talents of silver. It was this rapid increase in wealth that enabled rewards to be given for loyal service in the army and the employment of extra mercenary forces. So it was that by the time of Philip's death the army under the king's command had grown to over 30,000 foot soldiers and 4000 cavalry. The king also ensured that the expansion of the kingdom was permanent by allocating land won by the spear to his commanders and soldiery. These land-grants to the hetaireia or 'Companions' not only provided an income for the king's principal fighters while they were away on active service, but also broke down the captured territories thus fragmenting any resources that might be made available in any future revolt by the indigenous population.

Taking all the above evidence into consideration, one is forced to conclude that Philip made his own luck out of the political circumstances in which he found himself at the beginning of 359. His playing-off of one party's interests against another, as reflected in his relationships with both Athens and the Chalcidian League, and the use of marriage alliances to cement ties with helpful neighbours, such as the Thessalian League and Epirus, shows a man of astute political sense and timing. Combined with his skills as a military tactician and his overriding principle of rewarding the loyalty of his commanders and soldiery, Philip had the perfect balance for successful leadership in a time when other states were short on decisiveness but long on debate and in-fighting within their somewhat tired political systems. The principle of absolute monarchy had triumphed over democracy because the decision-making process within Philip's sphere of influence was rapid and uncluttered, enabling him to employ to the full his brilliant sense of timing. He was thus able to exploit to the full the inefficiencies of the rather cumbersome democratic system which had begun to manacle the Athenian state.

Philip was certainly aided and abetted by the indecision of others, but it was undoubtedly his skill at walking the political tightrope of the 4th century BC which was to lay the foundation for what was to be the greatest military adventure yet seen in the ancient world. Alexander had much to thank his father for when he began his long march into Asia, for it was Philip's intrigue and cunning that had raised Macedonia to the threshold of empire.

Bibliography

A. R. Burn: Persia and the Greeks - the Defence of the West, c. 546-478 BC (Biddles Ltd., Guildford, 1984). J. Crossland & D. Constance: Macedonian Greece (B. T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1982).

J. R. Ellis: Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (Thames and Hudson, London, 1976).

D. W. Engels: Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978).

N. G. L. Hammond: A History of Greece to 322 BC, Third Edition, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986).

N. G. L. Hammond: A History of Macedonia, Vol. I, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972).

P. Levi: Atlas of the Greek World (Phaidon Press Ltd., Oxford, 1980).

R. Sealey: A History of the Greek City States ca. 700-338 BC (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976).