Essay Question:

Was Athenian hegemony over the member-states of the Delian League inevitable?

Essay written by David Rohl (1st Year Ancient History/Egyptology).

Submitted to Riet van Bremen on 31st May 1988.

Strictly speaking nothing is ever inevitable. There is always a point in time when political developments can be altered before their own momentum makes them unstoppable. Thus it is quite possible to change the course of events and therefore history itself, even by what might at the time be perceived as the most insignificant of actions.

When we look back on our history with hindsight it is often easy to identify the moment when early action would have prevented a future major incident from occurring. More often than not, however, it is the cumulative effect of a series of smaller, less significant events, which provides the impetus for a shift in the power balance and which then in turn creates social instability; an impetus moreover which becomes virtually irrevocable once it is allowed to take firm root. In terms of human civilisation, where different social groups live side by side, the solution to such disturbances in the equilibrium inevitably rests in open conflict between the groups concerned, resulting in one side or other re-establishing order or stability through dominance, however temporary. The rise of the Athenian empire and the resultant conflict with Sparta is just such an example of the cumulative effect of minor incidents leading to an artificial and unstable dominance of one polis over others. The 'stasis' thus created on this inter-state scale had to lead eventually to a confrontation between the major powers – a long-running series of battles which we know today as the 'Peloponnesian Wars' (460-446 & 431-404 BC).

The beginnings of this change in the balance of the Greek political scene might be established at almost any point after the Dorian invasion since it could be argued that Athenian democracy itself was the catalyst of Athens' ambitions outside her own walls. There is also strong grounds to suggest that the protection and expansion of Athenian trade routes was a major factor in her wish to dominate the Aegean. For the purpose of this essay, however, the arguments will be restricted to the events following the Persian retreat from Greece in 479 when, the cessation of hostilities on the Greek mainland led to a marked change in Greek political perspectives. This year is also regarded by scholars as marking the transition from the Archaic to Classical Periods and thus is a good place from which to begin our analysis of Athenian ambitions and at the same time enable us to review the actions of Athens' neighbours to her policies.

The defeat of Persia and the formation of the Delian League

A brief account of the historical scenario for the period we are concerned with would at this point be useful so as to establish a framework for our discussion of the motives behind the events and the personalities who directed those events. This 50-year interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars is called the 'Pentekontaetia' by Thucydides and is dealt with in his Book I.

Following the battles of Plataea and Mykale, the Persian army did not dare set foot on the Greek mainland again but, even so, the war itself was not finally over. There still remained the issue of the oppression of the Greek city states on the west coast of Anatolia and the matter of the islands of the western Mediterranean still under occupation by Persian forces. It was therefore determined by the members of the Hellenic League that a campaign should be launched by sea to irradicate Persian control over the Greek-speaking world.

Success soon followed success and many of the islands and Ionian cities were relieved by the allies, but then a major crack in the alliance's otherwise united front began to appear – brought about by the foolish activities of the first of our leading characters to affect the future political development of Classical Greece.

The Spartan regent Pausanias, head of the allied fleet and victor of Plataea, suddenly began to behave with arrogance and contempt towards the allies, which, according to all the narratives we have about this period, greatly angered the leaders of the Ionian cities. Having just been relieved of the burdens of Persian rule they were certainly in no mood to tolerate the overbearing manner of an allied commander who had got too big for his boots. Sparta itself became aware of the trouble and recalled Pausanias to account for his actions – though, somewhat characteristically for Sparta, this was too late in the day to do any good.

The respected, though politically astute, Athenian commander Aristeides, who controlled by far the largest contingent of ships in the fleet, took advantage of Sparta's recall of Pausanias, and, while the Spartan commander was away, the Athenian strategos, famous for his sense of honour and justice, encouraged the Ionian cities to abandon the self-centred Pausanias and request a transference of the hegemony of the alliance to Athens. Needless to say, Athens accepted the new role with little reluctance, giving Kimon the supreme command of the fleet. As a result, when the replacement Spartan commander arrived with his much smaller contingent of vessels, he was immediately sent packing. Aristotle(?) adds some further information about the role of Aristeides in this crucial year following Plataea:

“... it was Aristeides who urged the Athenians to detach the Ionians from the alliance of the Lakedaimonians, watching for the moment when they were in bad odour because of Pausanias. As a result it was he who determined the first instalment of tribute from the poleis, in the third year after the sea-battle at Salamis, ...” [Aristotle?: Athenian Politeia, 23.4-5]

It was predominantly Aristeides himself then who arranged the formation of a new league, fixing the amounts paid by each member into the common fund which was set up on the island of Delos to support the war effort. And it is at this point that we come across another major factor which encouraged Athenian dominance over the Delian League, for many of the allies were reluctant to supply ships and forces for the naval campaigns and instead relied on a policy of financial support for the Athenian fleet, thus ensuring that Athens would maintain a military strength far greater than the rest of the alliance put together:

“For these developments the allies were themselves responsible; for the majority of them, because of their reluctance to go on campaign, let it be laid down that they should contribute money up to a sufficient level instead of ships, so as not to have to leave home; thus they increased the size of the Athenian navy with the money which they themselves contributed, while at the same time rendering themselves unprepared and incompetent for war when they revolted.” [Thucydides: 1.89-99]

The final blow inflicted by the Delian League on the Persian empire came in 470/69 when Kimon, and the Athenian forces under his command, destroyed the Persian army and captured 200 ships at the mouth of the River Eurymedon in Pamphylia:

“This achievement so humbled the will of the King, that he made the peace which everyone talks about, undertaking to keep a day's journey on horseback away from the Greek sea and not to sail past the Kyaneai or the Chelidoniai with a warship equipped for battle.” [Plutarch: Kimon, 12.6-13.5]

So the Persian war finally came to an end with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Callias (acknowledging the scholarly debate about this treaty, the fact that the Persians did not confront the Greeks again in the region indicates that some agreement was made whether formal or informal). What was to follow this victory was perhaps to be expected. The Athenians now found themselves in possession of a huge fleet and army with no war to fight, whilst the other junior members of the League began to feel less and less inclined towards the idea of financing its Athenian 'protection force' when the threat from the barbarian empire had apparently been dramatically reduced. From the end of the war on mainland Greece in 479 to the initial flare-up between Athens and the Peloponnesian League in 461 the Athenian stranglehold on the Delian League became ever tighter.

The Spartans, caught up in domestic revolts, spent most of this time patrolling their own domains, the state's attitude towards foreign affairs and its characteristic reluctance to look beyond its own borders doing little to stem the tide of Athenian imperialism. Connor notes the apparently marked differences between the national characteristics of the two poleis:

“The impression that emerges from the Pentecontaetia is of the restless energy of the Athenians, their refusal to be stymied, their ability to come out of every setback with even greater vigor than before. ... The Spartans by contrast, seem to have indecisive leadership and to be without a clear direction for growth. They distrust boldness and innovation.” [1]

Indeed, throughout what modern historians call the 'First Peloponnesian War' (460-446), it was the Spartan allies which tangled with Athens while Sparta itself remained largely on the side-lines as a spectator to the unfolding events. Finally though, by 431, she could delay no longer from what she knew had to be – the inevitable military stand which was needed to counter any further expansion of Athenian imperialism. The pro-Athenian Thucydides himself acknowledged that the war was an indisputable result of Athenian expansionist policy:

“All these events among the Greeks and between them and the Persians took place in approximately fifty years between the withdrawal of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. During this time the Athenians strengthened their control over the empire and made great strides forward in power. The Lacedaemonians, though they saw what was happening, did not try to stop it in any significant way, but remained tranquil for the better part of the period. Even before this they were not swift to go to war unless forced to it. They were also inhibited by domestic battles. But finally the power of the Athenians had advanced so unmistakably and their own alliance was so threatened, they they decided it could no longer be tolerated. They resolved that every effort was to be made and Athenian strength was, if possible, to be destroyed by the undertaking of this war.” [Thucydides: 1.118.2]

Having reviewed how Athens came to dominate the Greek world and how Sparta acquiesced to this by relinquishing her leadership of the alliance by default, we should now deal with some of the incidents which took place during the early years of the Delian League so as to determine how Athens fared as hegamone. By doing this we might then begin to understand her motives and therefore measure for ourselves the degree of importance which her citizens attached to their dominance of the Aegean.

Athens' attitude towards the other League members

After a relatively short spell of fairly universal popularity, as a consequence of the removal of Pausanias and their continuance of the fight against Persia, the Athenians too soon became oppressors. In c. 467, one year before the end of the war, the island polis of Naxos decided it wished to withdraw from the League and unilaterally announced her secession. Thucydides noted the ominous implications of the Athenian response which was to put down the dissent by force of arms and return Naxos to its financial supplicancy towards the Delian League and therefore the Athenian fleet.

One year after the victory at Pamphylia Athens was in conflict once again, this time with Thasos, over Athenian expansionist activities on the northern coast of the Aegean. Her powerful army and fleet overpowered the Thasians after a two-year siege and Athens took control of the valuable mineral deposits around Mount Pangaeum.

Then in 462 Athenian pride was badly damaged by the Spartan rejection of Athens' support in their war against the Messenian rebels. Kimon, having initially been asked to come to Sparta's aid and tramped halfway across the Peloponnese with 4000 hoplites, was not exactly thrilled to return without honour. With their army being sent home following a failed attack on the fortress of Ithome, the Athenian council could not fail to place the blame for such an embarrassment at their general's feet – after all it was he who had advocated Athens' support for Sparta in the first place. This rebuke appears to have been disastrous for Kimon's career and from then on the radical democrats under the sway of Ephialtes gained the upper hand in the assembly. Thucydides speculates about the real political reason for the Spartan action:

“... they were alarmed by the Athenians' daring and revolutionary spirit, ... and felt that if they stayed they might be persuaded by the defenders of Ithome to change sides.” [Thucydides: 1.102.3]

Whatever the truth may have been, the damage was done and Athens would not forget this humiliation in a hurry. The incident of the return of the 4000 from Messenia, above all other factors, appears to have been the turning point in the relationship between the two super-powers. It wrecked the alliance between Sparta and Athens and, 30 years later, resulted in open conflict between them. It had also served to swing the balance of Athenian politics in favour of the radical democrats and led to the rise to power of Pericles, following the assassination of Ephialtes. It was Pericles ambitious building program at Athens which created further resentment from the allies, whose tribute now paid for Athens' glorification:

“Greece was seen to be suffering a grievous insult and to be ruled by an open tyranny, as it watched the Athenians gilding their polis with the moneys which it had been compelled to contribute for the war and beautifying it like a wanton woman, decorated with precious stones and statues and thousand-talent temples.” [Plutarch: Perikles, 12.1-2]

The Tribute List of 454 goes some way towards substantiating Plutarch's colourful imagery, for, having removed the treasury of the League to Athens for 'security reasons' (!!) the leaders of the alliance proceed to hive off one sixtieth of the revenues for the enrichment of the cult of Athena (approximately 8 talents per year).

Pericles was also anti Spartan and pro western expansion, both of which led to further military expenditure and a draining of the resources of the Aegean states. The Athenian attitude towards its League allies on the Ionian coast, some of whom had originally acquiesced to Persian overlordship, is exemplified by the arguments of Euphemus at the Conference of Camarina:

“... they wanted enslavement and wanted to bring it upon us. As a result we deserve our dominance – because we supplied the largest fleet and the most unhesitating enthusiasm among the Greeks and because they willingly acted for the Persians and harmed us.” [Thucydides: 6.82.4-83.1]

Thus Athens could argue that there was nothing wrong in its subjugation of her allies – as long as it was for the good of Greek superiority as a whole over the barbarians. By the time of the Sicilian expedition the Delian League had evolved into an Athenian empire and was now, much to its discredit, manifesting itself as a tyranny over its one-time fellow League members. The Mytilenaian speech of 428 BC indicates just how uneasy some of the allies had begun to feel about the Athenian hegemony:

“The alliance between ourselves and the Athenians came into being when you (Spartans) withdrew from the war against the Persians and they stayed on to see what remained to be done. We became allies, however, not to enslave the Greeks to the Athenians, but to free the Greeks from the Persians. And as long as they led in an equitable fashion, we were glad to follow; but when we saw that they were abandoning their war with the Persians and pursuing the enslavement of their allies, our apprehensions were aroused. ... And so it was that we no longer trusted the Athenians as hegemones, bearing in mind what had happened; for there was no likelihood that men who had subdued those whom they accepted into a treaty relationship along with us would not, if they were able, do the same to those who remained.” [Thucydides: III. 10.2-6]

Conclusion

The approximately 150 members of the Delian League seem to have had a pretty rough deal from their Athenian leaders, although it must be said that many states loyal supported Athens to the end. This may have been partly through the traditional loyalties of Ionian culture but was most likely because the ordinary Greek citizen often depended on his employment as an oarsman in the Athenian fleet to finance his household and provide for his family. It takes a man of great political conviction to give up his major source of income in order to proclaim his city's right to equal status amongst its allies. Even so, expressions of dissent did surface on many occasions – particularly amongst the wealthier citizenry. One could argue that this might be expected given their non-dependence on Athenian military wages for their income, but this does not take into consideration the fact that, in the writings of Thucydides, we are bound to have only heard the complaints of the leading figures in Greek politics, who by nature are of the upper class. The thoughts of the ordinary citizen remain lost to us and it would be wrong to argue from silence for their assumed contentment with Athenian hegemony.

Undoubtedly Athenian trade played a very important part in Athens' need to dominate the Aegean. Without a secure sea route to the Thracian coast and Black Sea, Athens would have been at risk of failing to guarantee its grain supplies. Also, by controlling the Hellespont, its outposts could impose taxes on other merchantmen to help fill the coffers of the mother polis.

Blame must not be placed solely upon the shoulders of the Athenians for the state of affairs which followed the defeat of Persia. Sparta may be given the benefit of the doubt in respect of its runaway strategos, Pausanias, but must be held to account for its abject renunciation of the League's leadership in favour of an inward-looking policy. That it allowed Athens to get so far ahead in naval superiority must also have been a major factor in its resultant apathy towards the Aegean. It is clear from the earliest times (even back to Cretan Minos) that 'naval supremacy is the primary route to power in Greek history' [2] and this simple fact alone calls into question the tactical competence of the Spartan generals. Whilst acknowledging their remarkable bravery in hand to hand combat and the undisputed strength and competance of the Spartan land-based army, their reticence to develop a comparable sea-based fighting force dramatically exposes the two major flaws in the Spartan character – a reluctance to develop trade links with the outside world and the in-built phobia of an internal revolt brought about by the absence of their army caught up in overseas wars. Once again the realisation of these weakness came far too late. It was not until the decade immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War itself that the Spartan King Archidamus II began to voice the obvious:

“If we do not have naval superiority and cannot take away the flow of income from which they (the Athenians) support their navy, we will have the worst of it.” [Thucydides: 1.80.3-81.4]

It seems remarkable that Sparta had not seen the light even as early as the Persian War because, in the culminating years of the conflict, as Sealey observes, 'the Greek high command put its faith in resistance by land' but 'the results achieved in the campaigns of the two years were largely due to naval enterprise' [3].

With their rebuilding of the city wall and fortification of the Peiraeus following the Persian defeat, and by their besieging of Sestos on the Hellespont, Athens had given clear signals of its intention to dominate the vacuum left by the Persian withdrawal back to Anatolia. Themistocles is reported by Thucydides as making it clear that Athens 'must seize the sea' and the rest of Greece certainly allowed them to do just that. The Greek states compounded this felony by failing to supply more than a token number of ships to the new league's fleet and even provided the cash to enable Athens to build the very ships it needed to make its control of the Aegean complete.

Sparta's humiliation of its ally, Kimon, allowed the radical democrats, first led by Ephialtes and later by Pericles, to dominate the Athenian assembly which in turn led to the agrandisement of Athens at the expense and impoverishment of the League. That the members of the League let things go so far is perhaps symptomatic of an island peoples whose only real unifying force is a sudden common crisis. In that respect one could say that Athens' rise was inevitable on account of the fragmented character of the Greek speaking world and the all important fact that their empire was built from within and not imposed by 'barbarians' from outside Greek culture. They were never an invading force and so the imposition of Athenian rule was applied gradually until it was strong enough to prevent organised resistance. Would Athens have been able to get a foothold on the ladder to empire if Sparta had not been so indecisive in those crucial few years following Plataea? Such a question is impossible to answer, but Sparta's reticence to participate more fully in the final expulsion of the Persians was certainly a clear signal to the Athenians to take the reigns of power. By their very weakness as a collective political body, the Greek allies of the Hellenic League, who had fought so well together against Persia, provided a easy platform on which Athens could build her empire. As Crawford and Whitehead note, given the political nature of post-Persian-War Greece, the birth of a Greek empire was an inevitable consequence of the conflict. To the victor goes the spoils and it was Athens, and not the original war leader Sparta, which stayed the course right up to the final battle at Pamphylia in order to collect her reward. The Delian League was therefore an Athenian empire almost from its formation and certainly by the final defeat of Persia at Pamphylia:

“... the reality underlying the Athenian empire was unchanged from the beginning; but the relationship between the Athenians and their allies clearly became increasingly formalised as regulations were devised to deal with one problem or another, and this may have encouraged resentment ...” [4]

The resentment was certainly justified but, given the inability of the allies to share in the role of guardians of the Greek world, it is hardly justifiable to argue that Athens did not merit its empire – after all who can blame then for taking what was there for the taking.

Notes and References

1. W. R. Connor: Thucydides (Princeton, 1985), pp. 43-4.

2. W. R. Connor: op. cit., p. 25.

3. R. Sealey: The History of the Greek City States 700-338 B.C. (Berkeley, 1976), p. 239.

4. M. Crawford & D. Whitehead: Archaic and Classical Greece (Cambridge, 1983), p. 257.

Bibliography

Reference works used for the construction of the above historical scenario were:

Burn A. R.: The Pelican History of Greece (Harmondsword, 1987), Chapter 10.

Hammond N. G. L.: A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford, 1986), Book III, Chapter 5 and Book IV, Chapter 1.

Sealey R.: A History of the Greek City States: 700-338 B.C. (Berkley, 1976), Chapter 9.